Political officer Should political officers be returned to the Russian army: opinions Closer to the soldier

Activity Sergei Shoigu in the post of Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation does not dry out. Having decided on the issues of the body, which undoubtedly include saying goodbye to foot wraps and replacing the bath day with showers, the minister moved on to issues of moral education of military personnel.

In this regard, Shoigu announced a fundamental decision. The minister especially emphasized that this initiative should not be viewed as a vestige of the Soviet system. New educators, according to Shoigu’s vision, should be professionals in their field who know how to “work with the soul of a soldier.”

It is not yet known which university will train such professionals for the needs of the army. The minister himself believes that one of the civilian universities will take on this task, although he does not rule out that the mission could also be entrusted to a military university.

Commissioners are from Italy

The institution of military commissars, and subsequently political officers, is usually associated with the period of Soviet power, but historically this is not true.

The first commissars attached to military units appeared in the 16th century in the armies of the Italian republics. Since the units were formed from mercenaries, the duties of the commissars included monitoring the loyalty of the soldiers to the “employer”.

Almost the same functions - monitoring the loyalty of personnel - were the duties of commissars in units of the army of revolutionary France and units of American colonists in the War of American Independence.

In the army Tsarist Russia similar functions were performed by regimental priests, who, however, did not claim to control the troops during hostilities.

After the overthrow of the autocracy in Russia, the Provisional Government introduced the institution of commissars in military units, relying on world experience: the commissars of the Provisional Government monitored the loyalty of unit commanders.

However, the institution of military commissars became widespread after the October Revolution, when the new government, in need of professional military men, recruited former officers of the tsarist army into the service, without being absolutely sure of their loyalty.

Party representatives

To control the activities of the “military experts,” a representative of the Bolshevik Party with broad powers was assigned to them.

By 1919, under the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, first the Political Department was created, and then the Political Directorate, which regulated the activities of commissars in the troops.

The commissars were entrusted with both activities directly related to combat training and military operations, as well as propaganda work among personnel.

A lower level of political workers also appeared - political instructors, who performed the role of commissars at the company level and below. Unlike the commissars, they did not have the authority to interfere with the military command and were only involved in working with personnel.

Since 1925, the number of commissars began to decline - in units where the commanders were communists, their presence was not required.

The position of commissars was restored again at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, but was finally abolished in October 1942.

The reason for this was the lack of qualified personnel, as well as complaints from unit commanders - in fact, the presence of a commissar created dual power in the unit, which interfered with the accomplishment of combat missions.

The place of commissars was finally taken by political officers, who were subordinate to unit commanders and were engaged exclusively in political and educational work.

In the pre-war period and partly during the Great Patriotic War, it was noted that commissars and political officers often did not have the proper level of training to carry out the tasks assigned to them.

Double Strike

After the war, educational work in the army began to be given great importance. In 1967, 8 military-political schools were opened in the USSR, whose task was to train future political officers. The cadets of these schools received not only a military education, but also a civilian specialty, as a rule, “teacher of USSR history and social studies.”

The tasks of political officers included both national training of military personnel, their political education, and the suppression of hazing in units, ensuring a normal microclimate in the team.

By the time of the collapse of the USSR, there were 11 higher military-political schools, as well as one similar institution each within the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1992, due to a change in the political system, targeted training of political workers was discontinued, and the position of political officer was renamed deputy for educational work.

The lack of qualified personnel, who were no longer produced by the schools, led to the fact that these positions began to be occupied by both graduates of ordinary military schools and conscript officers, graduates of military departments of civilian universities.

As a result, educational work with soldiers whose educational level is new Russia fell sharply, almost disappeared. The result of this was the growth of hazing and low discipline in the army.

The understanding that educational specialists were dealt with, at the very least, unwisely, came in 2002, when the training of educational officer officers was resumed in a number of military universities.

The first graduates in the specialties “military special work”, “teacher-psychologist”, “moral and psychological support of troops” appeared in the units in 2007, and just two years later a new blow was dealt to educational officers.

The then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov considered educational work in the army unnecessary.

In 2009, as part of the reform, up to 70 percent of the positions of educational officers were reduced. In 2010, the status of the Main Directorate of Educational Work (GUVR) of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation was downgraded. The GUVR was transformed into a department under the Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, and about 40 percent of its staff positions were transferred from officers to civilians. These decisions caused extremely negative assessments among military experts.

Now Army General Shoigu will have to rebuild the destroyed system virtually from scratch.

Interview with the deputy unit commander for work with personnel.

- The first question will be terminological. Are specialists of your profile in the army so universally called “political officers”?

Yes. This is already such an established concept that... Well, judge for yourself what “deputy commander for work with personnel” sounds like?! Long. “Deputy for personnel”?! Not good. And “political officer” sounds clear and succinct. It’s even a common noun: a person who speaks a lot and competently.

- What educational institutions prepare future deputy commanders for working with personnel?

Traditionally, they are prepared by the Military University. I can’t say for sure whether he is preparing now, but until recently training was also conducted at the Novosibirsk Military Institute. Before the army reform, training of specialists in moral and psychological support was carried out in 7 higher military educational institutions.

- Can the position of “political officer” be filled by an officer who does not have a specialized specialty?

In my experience: the majority of officers occupying the positions of deputy commanders for work with personnel do not have training in this profile in educational institutions. Either these are engineers, tank crews, etc., who, by the will of fate, ended up in this position, or these are officers who received a civilian education at a university with a military department. The latter may have any cultural, psychological, or legal specialties.

- That is, we can say that an officer came to serve after the military department, and he was specially appointed to the position of “political officer,” where the quality of training seems to be not so important and there is less responsibility?

For the most part, this is how things are, since the level of training at a military university and at a military department is not comparable. So they put a person where, figuratively speaking, he will do the least harm. Or there is also this option: “Let’s go here for now, and there, if you prove yourself, we’ll see.”

- At the level of battalions and brigades there are “political officers”, but have they been returned to the companies? There were such plans.

I didn’t see them in the units I visited. But as far as I know, such specialists are being trained. It’s just that their positions are not introduced everywhere and immediately, so that their place is not taken by non-core specialists. That is, positions are introduced only for specific graduates. This is a very competent approach that eliminates the mistakes of the young Russian army of the early 90s.

- Are specialists really needed at the company level?

Yes. But they are not introduced everywhere. Combined arms units, where the number of personnel exceeds 100 people, must be staffed by deputy company commanders for working with personnel.

- What are the responsibilities of the current “political officer”?

Let's look at the statute. “Zampolit” - and the charter also says that the deputy commander for educational work, and not the deputy commander for work with personnel, is responsible for education, military discipline, moral and psychological state, public and state training of personnel and the effectiveness of work to ensure security of military service.
There is a common opinion among the troops that a “political officer” is an expert on unclear issues. If, let’s say, the issue is not within the competence of any of the deputies, then the political officer should deal with it. Although the political officer himself does not understand why he is doing all this [laughs].

- In the work of the “political officer” in the modern Russian army, do elements of the work of the “political officer” of the Soviet era remain?

For example, at that time there was socio-political training, and now it is social and state training. I will read out the lesson topics from the UCP plan for the current year. The first topic for all categories of military personnel is “Russia in modern world and the main priorities of its military policy." And then there are “Tasks of a soldier and a sailor of a military unit/ship for the current academic year.” Then the most important military battles that took place in different periods, Days of military glory, examples of heroism, hero cities. The system of government and state power is studied. Questions of traditional religions, traditions inherent in the peoples of Russia. These questions are very important, since only in my division at the moment Military personnel of more than ten nationalities serve. Next, Russian legislation and the responsibility of a military serviceman are studied. What is a military collective? In addition, we study the basics of international humanitarian law. I want to say something about him separately.
I started my service in a unit that is located far from all the hot spots, and at that moment our army was not conducting any active operations at all. Aspects of international humanitarian law did not seem to concern us at all. I was convinced that this discipline was unnecessary. And the very first business trip made me realize that this should have been studied yesterday. Now, as a training leader, I explain that this is more relevant than ever, that every soldier should know this. That when an order is received to carry out a combat mission, there will be no time to train the soldier to do this. Therefore, today we need to know that - here is my own example - when a serviceman takes [as a trophy] and wears the uniform of a foreign army because it is better, then he violates the norms of this humanitarian law.
These are the main topics of the classes. In addition, we always have a reserve of topics: we can independently propose one topic per month for study, based on the current situation.
There is also an information system - this is 30 minutes of time between breakfast and flag raising. This is any message about events in the country or abroad. In addition, according to the daily routine, there is a separate viewing of information programs: either “News” at 20 o’clock, or “Time” at 21 o’clock. But it is wrong to just watch; military personnel need to be explained what this or that event means and what consequences they will cause.
Typically, information sessions cover a maximum of 3 topics, one of which is the main one. The website of the Ministry of Defense is very helpful in searching for relevant topics, since any statements by top officials and the leadership of the Armed Forces are posted there. I read topics 2 times, memorize key points and speak without paper. Because if I read from it, then I have no faith. If I speak, it means I know what I’m talking about, and the listener believes me in this case.
There is also such a thing as prompt notification when any important event occurs. For example, when the Turks shot down our plane, at the nearest formation, which was half an hour after this information appeared in the news feeds, I conveyed this information to the personnel. Which even scared some people. Afterwards, one of the servicemen came up to me and asked: “Now are we going to Syria?!” I explained to him that we wouldn’t go right now, but we should know information about such an event.

- How do you provide such information?

Any information, any words that an officer conveys to personnel must be objective. No misrepresentation is permitted. All in fact: today at such and such a time our plane was shot down. There are experts' assumptions that the plane was shot down by a surface-to-air missile. This is a violation of such and such norms of international law, since the plane, according to the Ministry of Defense, was located there and it was impossible to shoot it down. They are looking for one pilot, the other is most likely dead. You are not saying all this on your own behalf, but are reporting the source of information. Then, when it appeared more information You report new facts about how the plane was shot down at a scheduled briefing.
In general, informing military personnel is the responsibility of their immediate commanders. But in this case, knowing that the level of information delivery would be lower in quality, I took over their functions.

- What sources do you get such operational information from?

I heard about the same plane on the radio in the car. Whenever I’m driving in the car, I turn on “Business FM”, “Vesti FM”, “Mayak” and another local regional radio station. There is news there every 15 minutes. If there is relevant information that concerns military personnel, then I report it. Just when I arrive at the unit, the unit is already set up for the morning divorce. Or, if something is very important, then I give the command for urgent construction.

- How often is information provided?

Regular information is provided twice a week. Military-technical information and legal information are carried out once a week, alternating. In addition, if we talk about all my classes, then public and state training is conducted twice a week. In addition, there are general meetings, educational work and leisure activities on Sunday, such as watching films. If we had Easter, then the topic of conversation with the personnel was “Svetloe Christ's Resurrection" Since we do not have a full-time assistant commander to work with religious servicemen, we invite representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, with whom we maintain relationships in our area. Members of the Orthodox community arrive and hold a small concert at the club. Military personnel professing Orthodoxy are invited to the event, and only by choice.

- Are there any ideological guidelines coming down from above?

All the topics on which we conduct classes in public and state training come from the Main Directorate for Educational Work. The notes themselves are published in the Orientir magazine. There is a problem here, because this magazine does not always reach the troops on time, but on the website electronic version It lays out exactly what without topics on social and state preparation. Question: Why do this if this is a Ministry of Defense publication aimed at military personnel of the Ministry of Defense? The magazine explains that the viability of the publication depends on the copies printed. There are, of course, resources on the Internet that publish these topics from Orientir, but the difficulty arises precisely with current topics that are not, say, in the last or the issue before that.

- So from time to time you just have to search the Internet for issues of this magazine scanned by well-wishers?

Not from time to time, but constantly. We also have to monitor the unit commanders to ensure that they use relevant topics in their communications. Otherwise they might pick up some old topic where the same Serdyukov is mentioned...

- By the way, about the former minister. Are there any reviews of his activities? Are the results of the Oboronservis case being considered?

He is rarely remembered. Regarding performance assessment. I never voice it myself, because it causes a storm of emotions among the personnel. Most contract servicemen and officers have an extremely negative attitude towards him. If it does come up, I try to say that in addition to negative things, there were also positive ones. For example, under him the creation of a new form began. I remember very well how he said that we should have a modern seven-layer form. At that time, I could not imagine in my imagination that the form could consist of some seven layers. So I draw these parallels and say that Serdyukov’s activities were quite multifaceted.

- You have already mentioned the Orientir magazine, which publishes topics relevant to your work. What else are you reading from teaching aids What do you read outside of work and do you have time for it?

This is a problem, there is simply no time to read. Some television programs help me in my work, for example, “Serving Russia” or “Military Secret” with Viktor Prokopenko. From there it is very convenient to take clichéd phrases and slogans, which can then be used in educational work to form public consciousness. Which can be “wetted”. We should not be afraid of the word “propaganda”, because according to the governing documents my work is listed as “propaganda”.
What I read outside of work. Basically, I listen to audiobooks on the way home, when I go on a business trip, etc. Thus, I re-read all the classical literature and works related to the army: Tolstoy, Bunin, Kuprin, Pushkin, Dostoevsky. Now there are many bloggers who write about military topics on forums and social networks.
In general, everything that I read during my off-duty time is in one way or another connected with psychology, worldview, the study of weapons, and the experience of foreign armies. For example, if you are a political officer in an anti-aircraft division, then you cannot help but know the specifics of the equipment in service in your unit. This will definitely be needed in your work. At least in order to have authority in the eyes of military personnel. Don't be afraid to ask your subordinates to show you how to do something you don't understand. This will add frankness to your relationship.

- You said that you were watching “Military Secret”. It's no secret that there are a lot of blunders and mistakes in this program...

They often discuss topics on which information is difficult to find elsewhere. For example, that in Western society stereotypes are spread about us, that Russians are drunkards, and the program gives examples that they drink just as much there. And this is not presented in fragments, but in such complex stories of 20 minutes about one thing. They allow you to look at a topic from an angle that you won’t find in other media. Yes, I see that there are mistakes there, that their information is not irrefutable, but useful material can be gleaned from these programs.

- If you watch various analytical programs on state channels, read and listen to pro-government public figures and publicists, it is not difficult to notice the progress of a certain general trend: Russia is surrounded by external enemies, and from within the “fifth column” is trying to raise its head. Therefore, they say, it is necessary to rally around the current government in order to resist the attacks of hostile forces. Do you provide information to your personnel in the same vein?

Let's start with the fact that among contract military personnel and officers there are people who often think in clichés like “everyone in power steals,” “it’s dangerous for us to publicly express one’s opinion,” “the bloody regime will imprison everyone.” At the same time, they do not delve deeply into the topic. I try to react like this:
- Everyone steals!
- Who is “everyone”?
- Yes, everyone knows about it!
-Who are these “who know everything”? Give at least one example.
- Yes, that’s the same Putin!
- What does he have?
- Well, here are the Panamanian offshores!
- Give an example so that at least something is registered there personally.
- Yes, everyone knows that he steals!
I try to have a constructive conversation in my classes, and not be content with rumors about “everyone knows.” Let me clarify that there are opposition forces that are trying to persuade public opinion on our side, but we are military personnel and cannot talk about whether we will carry out the order or not. That is, I separate flies from cutlets.
As for certain guidelines regarding the implementation of the official course. There is no such thing. Nothing comes down from above. There is an understanding that we [“political officers” - approx.] We cannot evaluate the activities of the higher command. I inform the officers that this cannot be done. We do not evaluate political topics, because this is public and state preparation, not political.
Any election campaigning is prohibited in the army. Even if the unit commander tries to say that there is such a leading party that increases our pay, then I will be the first to tell him that this cannot be done. That besides this party we also have other parties that pass the same laws.
I, as a political officer, can tell you how to participate in political life, but during off-duty time. How to fight corruption, for example, through appeals to executive authorities. That is, I must give the serviceman an understanding of how he can protect his rights, including by participating in political life. But I don’t push him to make a certain choice. Thus, I close the issue with a discussion of specific political figures and their activities in the territory of the unit.

- Are classes with contract soldiers and conscripts joint?

No. Classes with these categories of military personnel have different topics. Let me clarify that the commander conducts classes with his entire unit, but I train separately with contract soldiers. At the same time, ensuring all classes - plans, notes - is all “political officer”.
In addition to classes, there is also individual educational work. Each officer must have a plan for conducting educational work with personnel. During the day, the officer is required to talk within the framework of this plan with at least one serviceman. In practice, it is often more. Not all of them are recorded and processed as expected. For example, the other day I was leaving a checkpoint and saw that the duty officer had thrown his cigarette butt onto the roadway. The squad cleans up to the roadway, but does not clean the road itself. The serviceman is “cultured”, so in order not to litter on his own property, he went and threw the cigarette butt onto the roadway. I couldn't get past this ensign. I calmly and without irritation spent three to five minutes talking to him about how this shouldn’t be done. He explained why it was impossible, why after that he should not respect himself. He gave various examples, including from legislation and from moral considerations. We talked about how to make sure we don’t do this again. And he understood it.

- Does the higher command conduct any training with the “political officers” themselves?

Such classes should be held once every six months before the start of the next training period at the garrison, army, and district levels.

- Do military psychologists help you with your work?

At the unit level - the same brigade - there are psychological support groups. It is led by an officer - this is a captain's position, who has civilian specialists subordinate to him. This system is very effective. When previously each battalion had a psychologist position, this officer often performed only general duties. That is, he covered issues for which there were not enough general-arms officers to resolve them: he joined the squad and was involved in conducting some kind of training. When the position of psychologist was removed, they tried to shift his tasks to the political officer. But a specialist in working with personnel is not a psychologist, because they deal with more subtle matters and solve other problems. And these tasks may turn out to be beyond the capabilities of the political officer.
Now that there is a psychological support group, it is difficult to imagine the work of a “political officer” without interaction with it. Psychologists work at the unit level and issue full recommendations for each serviceman: what not to do with him, how to organize interaction with him. If the commander listens to their recommendations, then he can largely avoid any emergency situations.

- There are separate units, separate battalions, where the state does not require a psychological support group. How is psychological work organized there?

There is a frequency of psychological testing for military personnel: absolutely everyone, both soldiers and officers, undergoes it at least once every six months. It is carried out either by a visiting group of psychologists, or directly by the political officer himself. In the latter case, you need to work very clearly. It happens that an officer assigns some smart soldier to sit behind him so that he fills out the test. Not because he is hiding something, but because he doesn’t have time. And then it turns out that, based on the test results, this officer cannot be trusted with command. Then such an officer is already called directly to psychologists, and he is tested by them. There were such cases.
Officer testing is very important point. After all, they are not only responsible for themselves, but also for their personnel. It happened that officers lost their tempers and behaved inappropriately. Why is this so? Because control was lost, no work was done with it. Outwardly, such an officer seems to be a scoundrel, but you begin to understand and it is clear that he is simply mired in his problems and intrapersonal contradictions.

- Has it ever happened that an officer was removed from service after studying the results of his tests?

I know of cases when a psychologist came to the commander and, without going into details, said: “ This person must be immediately removed from this or that situation and released from official duties.” The commander gives him leave, before leaving for which a psychologist works with the problem officer.

- Let me clarify: in this case, the commander is obliged to let you go on leave or can he let you go?

Maybe. But an experienced commander will not refuse the recommendations given by a psychologist.

- Is the current staff of psychologists sufficient to cover all military personnel? I remember that at my base, 2 full-time psychologists only had time to test the newly arrived reinforcements and work every day with the personnel taking guard duty.

Now the combined arms brigade has 5-6 specialists on its staff. In addition, the main thing in psychological work is to identify a risk group, that is, people who need to be put under dynamic observation. And this is not the entire composition of the brigade. These people constantly visit psychologists and receive recommendations for working with them. Also, the task of psychologists includes selecting people for sergeant positions and working with those taking guard duty.

- What does such selection for sergeant positions look like?

The commander, if he wants to promote any serviceman to the position of sergeant, collects test reports for all subjects of training - there, naturally, there should be grades of “good” and “excellent” - and recommendations from a psychologist regarding whether the candidate has the ability to command and work with personnel. For example, they may write about increased aggression, the possibility of using physical force in case of disobedience, or the inability to draw conclusions from the current situation. That is, a candidate can be a genius, with excellent training, but at the same time have antisocial behavior. Such a person is not suitable for a command position.

- You told how it should be, but in practice...?

No, no, no, they won’t appoint a sergeant in my unit... I’ll even say more, they won’t hire a contract soldier in my service without the recommendation of a psychologist. There are, of course, cases when the recommendations of a psychologist are not taken into account at all. It all depends on the commander.

- Can a soldier be placed on guard duty if there is a psychologist’s recommendation not to do this?

Of course, the commander can ignore the psychologist’s recommendation, but in this case he takes full responsibility upon himself. It is unlikely that the officer will do this, because he personally attaches the psychologist’s report to the guard sheet and confirms that he has read it.

- Are you charged with the duty of encouraging military personnel to sign a contract?

There is a certain list of positions that must be filled by contract servicemen. Based on this list, each commander is given the task of selecting military personnel for contract service. Practice shows that a contract soldier from your battalion is much better than a person who came from civilian life. You don’t know the one who comes, but you know your own like a lad, since he has already proven himself in the service one way or another. You understand what to expect from him in a given situation.
The selection tasks are set quantitatively, that is, every month you must persuade approximately so many people to sign for a contract. It cannot be that no one is provided in a month.

- Is the selection plan realistic? Can it be done?

In general, yes.

- How many people per month should you recruit for contract service per month?

Roughly speaking, one person per month per company. One or two candidates out of 20 people.

- What if it doesn’t work out? Well, people don’t come, they don’t want to?

You can postpone it to the next month, but then you will need twice as many people. It is possible, as I already said, to attract civilians. As I already said, the option of attracting is not very good, since such a person is unknown. Practice shows that he may then want to quit at any time. Like, I found a better paying job, my wife is filing for divorce, I earn little, fire me. At the same time, he simply does not want to resign because of a negative article. A formal approach to service begins, he does not want to fulfill his duties. And it turns out what we warned about: there is no need to hire a contractor from outside.

- Do I understand correctly that even now commanders are trying in every possible way to delay the dismissal of contract soldiers, so as not to receive a scolding from above due to a decrease in the level of staffing of the unit with contract servicemen? Like, why didn’t you, comrade officer, keep the person, don’t you think about the indicators?!

Yes. "You are working poorly [with personnel]! You don’t educate them!” But when a person initially enlists in the service simply to survive difficult times, and the service period is three years, it is difficult to change the approach to the work of such a contract soldier.
If a contract employee, some time after completing a three-month probationary period, has a goal to quit, then I offer them three options.
First. Still continue to serve until the end of the contract. But then the contractor’s goal is not fulfilled.
Second. Serve poorly and quit immediately. That is, we collect all the negativity and dismiss him for a “bad” article with the corresponding consequences: it is impossible to be reinstated in the service, getting into any law enforcement agencies or government agencies is problematic.
Third. We are trying to quit on a “positive” basis: relatives got sick, we need care, we found a better paying job.
Some people try to quit using the third option, but I have never seen a successful attempt.

- “Zampolit” conducts any training with officers of his unit?

There is a system for working with command staff of units. The classes explain how to work with different categories of military personnel. Using specific examples, we explain how, for example, to conduct personal affairs, apply disciplinary practices, interact with contract soldiers and conscripts, representatives of various nationalities, how to organize and what to talk about during national training.
To conduct such classes efficiently, it is necessary, by the way, to be present in specific units to see how the commander interacts with his subordinates. If he can’t do anything but scream and swear in the spirit of the sergeant from “Full Metal Jacket” or the character Nagiyev with the parody “10th Company”... I always give these examples, show these characters, the person looks, laughs and not always understands that he is doing the same. It is necessary to make it clear that this cannot be done and explain why it is impossible. At the same time, you should understand that you should also not say that you only need to work like this person who does everything right. Every person is different and everyone has their own working style. It’s just that everyone must understand that they must be within certain limits, beyond which they should not go.
Axiom - you can't hit. Why it’s not possible - this needs to be explained to the officer. Because as soon as you hit a person, you thereby showed him the extreme of your negative reaction. This means that the person will think that everything before the blow is possible. He doesn’t hit – and that’s okay, because his extreme reaction is to hit. The same with shouting: the louder the officer yells, based on snot and drool, the less they will listen to him when he speaks normally. At the same time, the officer may sincerely not understand what’s going on: “I’m yelling at them because they don’t understand! I scream, but they don’t listen! They're all stupid freaks!" What kind of attitude can you expect from a soldier if he is told that they are all obviously freaks?! That’s why I always explain to officers that you can’t hit them, there’s no need to yell. In this case, it is necessary to separate two concepts: shouting and commanding voice. It’s one thing when you speak so that everyone can hear, it’s another when you turn purple, widen your eyes and start screaming.
And more about pedagogy. Never say something you can’t do, and if you say it, then you must do it. Pedagogy is taught in all military educational institutions. Any officer studies it, but this does not mean that he has mastered its methods and principles. Unfortunately. That’s why I always say: “Don’t promise what you won’t do. You can yell as much as you like afterwards, it won’t help. It is necessary to explain the rules of the “game”. Did you say that you will punish me for this and that? Punish. Then you will be respected, at least simply for keeping your word.”

- Do officers really listen during classes, or is it “if necessary, then we are present”? It is not difficult to imagine the possible logic of the same company commander: “I have been communicating with soldiers every day for several years now, I know what approach is needed to whom. And here a person from the outside, who has no personnel under his command, tells me something about working with military personnel.”

The attitude towards your activities stems from the degree of responsibility with which you approach the performance of your duties. I entered this profession deliberately and I like the work I do. In any activity there is negative aspects, which I don't really like, including any negative attitude with which I am treated. But this is until people are confronted with the results of my work. This is not to say that I’m such a cool “political officer.” No. It’s just that if you yourself treat your events and subjects as the most important, when you live it all yourself, force the officers to do it and hold them accountable for it, then the attitude will be appropriate. “Look, he fights to the end!” That is, they will no longer tell me that the UCP is not needed, that information can be skipped.

- Are there requirements for “political officers” to speak foreign languages?

No knowledge requirements foreign languages It is not required for officers, with the exception of some intelligence units. This is often a problem, especially in events outside Russian Federation. I know of a case when our military personnel, as UN peacekeepers, participated in joint patrols in the zone of one armed conflict. The translator, an officer from one of the countries of the former USSR, quite freely translated what our officers were saying. Quite freely. It was clear that something was wrong, but none of our peacekeepers spoke English properly.

The Main Military-Political Directorate (GVPU) has been established within the structure of the Russian Ministry of Defense. This is stated in the decree of Russian President Vladimir Putin, which was published the day before on the official portal of legal information. Colonel General Andrei Kartapolov was appointed head of the institute.

The GVPU disappeared in 1992. Responsibility for the moral and psychological state of military personnel was borne by the Main Directorate for Work with Personnel (GURLS). This structure changed its name several times. Now, the Center for Military-Patriotic Work of the RF Armed Forces, the Center for Psychological Work of the RF Armed Forces and the 49th Center for Technical Equipment will be subordinate to the recreated GVPU.

Military historian, director of the Air Defense Forces Museum Yuri Knutov answered questions from Russian Planet about the reasons for the creation of the GVPU. According to him, the revival of the Main Military-Political Directorate within the Ministry of Defense should have a positive impact on the discipline and moral and psychological state of the personnel of the RF Armed Forces.

The initiative of the Ministry of Defense unwittingly resembles a reconstruction of Soviet practice. Any hint of politics in the army and the word “political officer”, which returns to the lexicon, are associated on a subconscious level with sickening propaganda, absolutely useless and even harmful for the army.

Don't rush to conclusions. There was a political department in the Soviet army, which was actually part of the CPSU apparatus. It was mainly engaged in the dissemination of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, and patriotism and the organization of leisure were in secondary roles. Such close and sometimes artificial involvement of the army in politics brought contradictory results.

Before the Great Patriotic War, even decisions that had nothing to do with ideology were not made without the consent of a political worker. The commissar was the second person in the unit after the commander. Dual power had negative influence on the combat readiness of the Red Army in the most difficult year of 1941. An ardent opponent of this state of affairs was Marshal Georgy Zhukov. By the way, his irreconcilable position was one of the reasons for his disgrace.

In the post-war years, political instructors and political officers did not have the same power. But a radical restructuring of the propaganda machine in the Armed Forces did not occur. It still didn't work at its best.

Very often the officer responsible for political education could not find common language with personnel, conducting a dialogue at the level of complex terminologies that do not fit into a soldier’s head. At the same time, political officers often had little understanding of their nominal military specialty, devoting more time to studying ideological dogmas. All this caused ridicule and negativity.

However, the situation began to change in the late 1970s. The USSR Ministry of Defense began to pay much more attention to the training of commanders. In the 1980s, the level of professionalism of the command staff, including political officers, increased significantly. Proof of this is the fact that many political officers who were trained in the last 10-15 years of the existence of the USSR made a successful career in military service in the Russian Federation or made a good political career.

These were political officers who could actually replace the commander of a unit or unit in an emergency. However, the lion's share of the problems of the USSR Ministry of Defense could not be solved. Hazing remained the most terrible scourge of the army, although political workers responsible for the moral state of personnel were supposed to curb it.

Were there any successful “forms” of coexistence between political workers and commanders and military officers in the Soviet army?

Yes. This was the practice. As a rule, this concerned units led by front-line soldiers. The commanders were responsible for combat training, and political officers did not interfere in this process, carried out ideological work and organized leisure time. However, there were not many examples of such coexistence.

Why is the Russian Ministry of Defense restoring the not-so-successful practice of having a political institution in the army?

Firstly, the army must have an officer who performs the functions of a political officer minus the ideological background. There is no need to somehow demonize the institution of the Main Military-Political Directorate. This is also very important work, which has a huge impact on the moral and psychological state of the fighters and on the atmosphere in the team.

IN Soviet years all political officers were divided into two categories. The first professed the principle of “do as I do” and, by its example, inspired the personnel and helped them master a military specialty, while the second personified the principle of “do as I said.” This clumsy, thoughtless and inhumane approach formed the basis of the extremely negative attitude to the GVPU.

I don’t think that now there will be a revival of the vices of the Soviet institution of commissars, political instructors and political officers. There are no prerequisites for this. After all, there is no ideology in Russia. The creation of the Main Military-Political Directorate, in my opinion, is justified by the fact that today we are witnessing with our own eyes the consequences of the information war against Russia.

In the minds of young people and 30-year-old contract soldiers entering military service, an idea of ​​​​the current political situation should be put into place. Military personnel should not succumb to provocations that regularly appear on the Internet.

I mean the numerous fakes circulating in the media and social networks with the aim of discrediting Russia, its Armed forces and constitutional order. They are trying to portray our country as an aggressor, they are trying to hold it responsible for crimes that it did not commit. There should not be such unrest caused by absolutely false statements in the army.

But won’t such political education lead to the formation of the “only correct point of view” on events in the country and in the world? Wouldn't this be tantamount to ideological indoctrination during the USSR period?

No, this is completely different. I repeat: there is no ideology in Russia. Modern political officers will focus more on explaining the agenda, patriotic propaganda, tightening discipline, organizing leisure and sporting events. The main task is to make the life of a fighter rich intellectually and culturally without imposing sympathy for any political force. This is a delicate and complex job, but I am sure there are appropriate personnel for it.

“Grafting them into modern conditions is an almost impossible task... The lack of ideology in Russia, as such, is the first problem that appointees may face...”

Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced his intention to restore educational structures in the army. “In Soviet times, political deputies played a very important role. A lot depended on them. Not only the moral and psychological state of military personnel, but also promotion. Currently, deputy commanders have lost their role. Their value is greatly reduced. The decision of the new Minister of Defense to increase the status of deputies will affect the image of the Russian army, as well as improve the ideological and political state of military personnel and officers. I think that this will only play a positive role in solving the problems facing the army,” he shared his opinion with Finam FM reserve lieutenant colonel Sergei Ermolenko. “I can’t imagine an army without officer-educators. However, it is fundamentally important to train educators, and not treat them as “a remnant of the Soviet era.” It is impossible to allow a teacher in the army to be a “deputy for general issues,” said Sergei Shoigu in an interview with the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper. According to him, the officer-educator “is obliged to know how a soldier lives, what he does, which of the personnel smokes, who drinks, what the situation is like at home for the guys.” “He must be able to work with the soul of a soldier...”, the minister added. defense In addition, Sergei Shoigu said that the Ministry of Defense plans to create a special commission that will search for solutions to the issues raised before the department. “I am sure that we are able to solve every problem, and we will solve it, but a balanced approach is required. Why is it important to hear different opinions? And those professionals who serve in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, and those who are already in the reserve or retired. Therefore, we intend to form an expert community under the ministry. In my experience, such specialists are able to give many useful recommendations,” the head of the defense department emphasized.

IAREX: Is it necessary to return political officers to the Russian army?

Grigory Trofimchuk, political scientist, first vice-president of the Center for Modeling Strategic Development: What - the priests in the army did not cope with their task? So then we need to say this directly, and not give them resurrected political officers as assistants, with a slightly different, shy and vague job title, so that it doesn’t hurt anyone’s sensitive ears.

But, again, we need to start with the most important thing, as after the resuscitation of another Soviet artifact, the “five-year plans”: with the cleansing of the oligarchs and the return of Soviet prices for essential goods, including free apartments for working people. Why do we need political officers without these main Soviet preferences?

It’s time to also pay attention to the internal army address “Comrade”. All around are gentlemen, beggars, oligarchs, all comrades outside the army have long been abolished, except perhaps Comrade Bilalov, who bears this title personally. But for some reason they remained in the army - are they waiting for the political officers to return? Addressing the Commander-in-Chief as “Comrade President” sounds as ridiculous as “Mr. Servant.” Therefore, if we are to re-introduce an officer-educator, then we should call him that, in tandem with the existing “comrade” and without any hesitation - political officer. Or: introduce, in tandem with the existing priests, an “educator officer.” There must be, after all, some kind of coherent set here.

Since the army has abandoned the battle flag with the “hammer and sickle” that fluttered over the Victory Parade-45, since the country no longer awards its heroes with Soviet awards, but only solid crosses, then we should seriously think about the transition to all these glorious “ Your Excellency", "Your Excellency" and "Your Honor".

And it would be nice: everyone good traditions there would be a place here, as well as on the eclectic banner of the Russian army. Here you have five-pointed stars, here you have Russian folk patterns with Slavic script, here you have a double-headed eagle.

Approximately the same ingredients that exist should now appear in army life: here you have priests, and political officers with “comrades”, and “your Lordships”.

There is only one question left: will this terrible mess inspire soldiers to go into real battle under it and risk their own lives? And what will the resurrected political officer say about this? How can educational work be carried out in principle in such a mess, when there are no principles or ideology? It turns out that Russia today not only does not have a probable adversary and external enemies (we are afraid to even name them), but also a basic understanding of what the Russian army itself should look like.

Roman Liskin, journalist:

I think that the institution of “political officers” has always been “bastard”. Political officers were never loved, but they were feared because of their official denunciation. To adapt them to modern conditions is an almost impossible task - this is an attempt to change the cart into high-quality winter tires. The lack of ideology in Russia, as such, is the first problem that appointees may face. Best option for the Russian army - regular visits by famous religious leaders to various concessions of military units. Missionary work in Africa or China is also a necessary task, but missionary work in the Motherland on such nutritious soil as soldiers is much more important. Various kinds of “registered priests” or psychoanalysts will be subject to no less obstruction, just as “political officers” of all stripes will not create an atmosphere of trust among yesterday’s hooligan schoolchildren. They are the ones who fall under the call, unlike the “refined majors” for whom there is someone to pay.

GlavPUR, the Main Political Directorate, will be revived in the Russian Army. The deputy chairman of the Public Council under the military department, Alexander Kanshin, announced this the day before. Along with the department abolished under Yeltsin, political officers - deputy commanders of units for political affairs - will also be returned to the troops. It’s no secret that the meaning of all their work is the ideological “pumping” of personnel, but in fact modern Russia There seems to be no state ideology? Or has she already appeared in the army? Are they needed at all, these political officers and political instructors, but still commissars?

Ivan Konovalov, Director of the Center for Strategic Conjuncture

– The authors of the initiative have not explained to us how the revived GlavPUR will coexist with the personnel management department. It looks like this issue has not been resolved at all. But if they were going to restore the political administration, it means they also thought about the ideological component. Otherwise, there is no point in building a garden. As I understand it, they are going to put patriotism at the forefront. Which in itself is not an ideology, but for the first time, maybe it will do. I understand, and the military, I hope, also understands what prompted the revival of the political department. Cadets dancing in dubious equipment, lack of motivation among young officers. The idea is good, but I’m afraid that it will not be implemented as we would like.

The restoration of the political department, according to Kanshin, is a fundamentally resolved issue - it would be advisable to form it on the basis of the existing Main Directorate for Work with Personnel (GURLS). Thus, the previous Soviet system is being restored, when a propagandist was assigned to the military unit from the battalion onwards, who was directly subordinate to the political officer. But where is the army command going to recruit such a number of officers, because political officers should be not only in battalions, but also in companies. Whether the issues of his uniform and salary have been resolved is a rhetorical question. More likely no than yes.

It is also unclear how the new army hierarchy will be built, which will again include the recreated political department. This is not an idle question; even in Soviet times there was no complete clarity. In other military units, the “second number” after the battalion commander was not the chief of staff, but the political officer. And this caused a lot of problems for all personnel. Judging by the fact that the entire chief command will be recreated under political officers, it is far from certain that the authority of the chiefs of staff will not be irreparably damaged. And here’s another important question: where are the leadership of the Ministry of Defense going to train political officers? The military-political schools that trained them have long been abolished or repurposed. Another question: who, exactly, will teach political officers? Will they mobilize retirees or, what’s more, representatives of the party in power for this purpose? There are no answers to these questions, but experts from the Ministry of Defense have already calculated how much money will be needed to implement the project - about 100 billion rubles. And it is somehow doubtful that the project will fit into this amount. But it looks like someone just liked the idea of ​​making astronomical money under the guise of good intentions.

However, it really makes sense to revive GlavPUR. “Teach a faithless army how to sharpen burnt-out iron: it will break,”

Suvorov taught. The feat of the political instructors of the Great Patriotic War can hardly be questioned. The Nazis, as a rule, left the captured commander alive. Political officers were shot on the spot. Isn't this recognition of the effectiveness of their work? Judging by the tense foreign policy situation, political instructors now have the best place in the army. But a good undertaking would not end in ostentatious campaigning, as often happens with us. And for this, the command must clearly answer the question: why revive the institution of political officers?

On topic

Serving in the US military for transgender people will become more difficult after the directive of US President Donald Trump comes into force. In accordance with it, people who have changed their gender will have to serve in the gender registered at birth.

Version 1

Then, in order to “master” tens of billions of rubles

Let's count together: in the late USSR there were 11 military-political schools plus a military-political academy. Today we need at least three of them. Even if they are established, so to speak, on the bases of existing combined arms schools, they will need teachers and some kind of material base. But 100 billion rubles for everything about everything, you see, is impressive. Where this amount came from, what is included in it, and over what period they plan to spend it is unknown. Try to find the average budget of a military school in the public domain - you won’t find it, it’s a military secret. The declared 100 billion can also become a “military secret” and most likely will become one if the public is not provided with a material and technical justification for the project. Do you believe that it will be provided? That's it. It looks like someone just wants to line their pockets and make money from a good idea.

Version 2

Then, to ensure career growth for the generals

It was in South Ossetia that it was easy to advance in the service by attaching stars one after another to general's shoulder straps. He screwed as much as he wanted: his own hand is the master. But in Russia this is much more difficult. The “ceiling” for the head of the GURLS is Lieutenant General. The revived GlavPUR promises to raise this “ceiling” to a colonel general, or even to an army general (keeping in mind the long-standing Soviet tradition). According to military experts, at least one and a half to two dozen new general positions will appear in the political department. Add here at least three more general positions for the heads of military-political schools. An excellent springboard for career growth, great opportunities!

Version 3

Then, in order to return officers discharged to the reserve to the troops

This version of what was happening was also voiced. It is known that as a result of the “reforms” of Anatoly Serdyukov, about 200 thousand career officers left military service. Some have left permanently, but there are many who are ready to return and still serve the Fatherland. We count again: about 800 thousand soldiers and officers serve in the Russian army. This is approximately 2 thousand battalions. They have three companies each, which means another 6 thousand political officers will be needed. And in total - at least 8 thousand. There will probably be many more applicants, which means it won’t be that difficult to select the best ones. On average, a military school graduates about 60–70 officers a year, so the old cadres will be around for a long time. And, what is important, the return of the officers dismissed by Serdyukov will be perceived by society as an act of triumph of justice.